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German Net Investment and the Cumulative 
Real Wage Position 1925-1929. 
On a Premature Burial of the Borchardt Debate 
Mark Spoerer* 
Obviously, Weimar suffered from a bitter distri-
butional struggle, and it is difficult not to take the 
side of the underdog. Statistics are cold, and it is 
very hard to warm up to Weimar's industrialists. 
G D . Feldman 1 
A b s t r a c t : In H S R ' s last issue, Hans-Joachim Voth challen-
ged thé 'crisis before the crisis ' hypothesis introduced by 
Knut Borchardt in 1979, resulting in a lively discussion 
among German and British economic historians of the Wei-
mar Republic, the 'Borchardt Debate ' . Whereas the discus-
sion so far has focused on the causes, Voth questions the 
main symptom and thus the whole debate: according to 
him, Weimar 's investment record was not significantly 
different from the German Empire ' s , and empirical identi-
fication of wage pressure, considered as the main cause for 
Weimar 's economic weakness in Borchardt 's seminal pa-
per, was due to inappropriate measurement. Voth concludes 
that »the debate over the weakness of the Weimar economy 
should be over«. - This paper challenges Voth 's methodo-
logy and the logic of his inferences. Using a variety of 
statistical sources and both his own and a more adequate 
measurement concept as well, it is argued that Weimar 's 
net investment ratio was considerably lower than that of the 
Empire. Furthermore, it is shown that Voth's own calcula-
* Address all communicat ions to Mark Spoerer, Ludwig-Maximil ians-Univers i ta t , 
Volkswirtschaftliches Institut, Seminar fur Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Ludwigst r . 33/IV, 
D - 8 0 5 3 9 Munich; e-mail: mark.spoerer@econhis t .vwl .uni-muenchen.d400.de; fax 
+49 /89 /2180-3169 . -1 would like t o thank Brian A ' H e a r n , Jörg Baten, He lge Berger , 
Brit ta Bopf, Knut Borchardt , Paul Katzenberger, John Komlos , Michael Rai th , Su-
sann Schmidtke, Ulrich Woitek, and especially Albrecht Ritsehl for el iminating errors 
and inconsistencies in earlier drafts of this paper. All remaining errors are of course 
m y own . 
1 G .D. Fe ldman (1985) , 'Weimar from Inflation to Depression: Exper iment or G a m -
b l e? ' , in idem (ed.) , Die Nachwirkungen der Inflation auf die deutsche Geschichte 
1924-1933, München , pp . 3 8 5 - 4 0 1 , here p . 395 . 
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tions of labor 's share of the real product confirm Bor-
chardt ' s wage pressure argument rather than contradict it. 
Hence, Voth's arguments are not sufficient to reject the 
Borchardt Hypothesis, much less to end the Borchardt De-
bate. 
Fifteen years ago, Knut Borchardt questioned the then-prevailing picture of 
relatively stable economic development in Germany between 1925 and 1929 -
'The Golden Twenties ' - by arguing that the Weimar economy suffered from 
severe structural problems and was therefore unviable in the long run. This new 
interpretation, combined with his provocative theses about Brüning 's Zwangs-
lagen (constraints), led to a vivid and very productive debate about the Weimar 
economy. Borchardt, soon joined by Harold James, reintroduced arguments 
which had been made by the entrepreneurs in the contemporary debate over 
high wages, too large social security benefits and excessive taxation. Growth of 
real wages was said to outstrip that of labor productivity, thus causing a 'profit 
squeeze ' which obstructed capital formation necessary for the rationalization of 
industry. In this view, the Weimar economy was a victim of distributional 
conflicts. 2 
Other economic historians either conceded that the late 1920s could no lon-
ger be considered as a normal period of stabilization but blamed other causes, 
or restricted the idea of Germany ' s structural weakness to the monetary sector 
only. Using a more adequate productivity measure to calculate the cumulative 
real wage position (labor 's share of output) than Borchardt, Carl-Ludwig Holt-
frerich argued that real wages were not too high. In his opinion, the ability of 
German industry to invest was restrained by the disintegration of the world 
economy and high interest rates in Germany. He also criticized the high degree 
of concentration and cartelization of industry. 3 This point had already been 
2 K . Borchardt (1979) , 'Zwangs lagen und Handlungsspie l räume in der g roßen Wir t -
schaftskrise der frühen dreißiger Jahre: Zur Revis ion des überlieferten Geschichts-
b i ldes ' , Jahrbuch der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, München , pp . 
8 5 - 1 3 2 ; Engl ish translation of a slightly revised vers ion in: i dem (1991) , 'Constra ints 
and r o o m for manoeuvre in the great depression of the ear ly thirties: towards a 
revis ion of the received historical p ic tu re ' , in idem, Perspectives in Modern German 
Economic History and Policy, N e w York, pp . 143 -160 , 2 3 8 - 2 5 8 ; cf. also Borchardts 
latest contr ibution to the debate: idem (1990) , 'A Decade of Deba te About Brün ing ' s 
Economic Po l i cy ' , in J. v. Kruedener (ed.), Economic Crisis and Political Collapse. 
The Weimar Republic 1924-1933, N e w York/Oxford/Munich, pp . 9 9 - 1 5 1 . H. James 
(1988) , Deutschland in der Weltwirtschaftskrise 1924-1936, Stuttgart, p p . 3 9 7 - 4 0 2 ; 
English original: idem (1986) , The German Slump. Politics and Economics 
1924-1936, Oxford. 
3 C.-L. Holtfrerich (1984) , 'Zu hohe Löhne in der Weimarer R e p u b l i k ? ' , Geschichte 
und Gesellschaft 10, p p . 1 2 2 - 1 4 1 , here p. 135; idem (1990) , 'Was the Pol icy of 
Deflat ion in Germany Unavo idab le? ' , in J. v. Kruedener (ed.), Economic Crisis and 
Political Collapse. The Weimar Republic 1924-33, N e w York/Oxford/Munich, pp . 
6 3 - 8 0 , here pp . 78f.; cf. also J . v. Kruedener (1990) , ' Introduction: T h e »Borchardt 
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pointed to in the contemporary debate by Joseph Schumpeter anticipating Bor-
chardt 's argument in a strikingly similar way . 4 In a recent monograph, Theo 
Balderston challenged the idea of Weimar 's real economy being structurally ill. 
According to his view, entrepreneurs had had excessively optimistic expecta-
tions and thus had invested too much in the 1920s. When they realized that 
their expectations had not been met, they blamed high wages and high taxes, 
which were variable in the short run in contrast to their excess capacities, which 
were sunk costs. Disappointed, entrepreneurs curbed investment; they were on 
»a 's tr ike ' of capital«. In Balderston's view, the resulting business pessimism 
and inflation anxiety were the main causes for the severity of the German 
s lump. 5 
In a recent paper published in this journal, Hans-Joachim Voth puts the 
whole debate into question. 6 He argues that between the prewar period and the 
years 1925-29 there was (A) no significant decrease in real net investment per 
capita, and (B) no relevant increase in the German worker ' s cumulative real 
wage position (CRP). Therefore, Voth questions not only Borchardt 's indeed 
much disputed hypothesis on the causes of the alleged weakness of the Weimar 
economy (B), but its main symptom (A) and thus the whole debate, too. His 
line of reasoning is as follows: 
( A l ) So far, in the debate over Weimar 's economic weakness in general and 
low investment in particular, scholars have not taken into account that a 
comparison between real net investment of the prewar period and the late 
1920s has to be adjusted for the dramatic change in the demographic 
regime which took place after 1913 (p. 130). 
(A2) Calculation of real capital growth on per capita basis changes the results 
(p. 131). 
Debate« on the Fai lure of Economic Pol icy at the End of the Weimar Repub l i c ' , in 
ibid., pp . XI-XXDC, here p . X X V . 
4 C f . J .A. Schumpeter (1927), 'D ie Arbeits losigkeit ' , Der Deutsche Volkswirt 1, pp . 
7 2 9 - 7 3 2 , and: idem (1929) , 'Grenzen der Lohnpol i t ik ' , in: ibid. 3 , p p . 8 4 7 - 8 5 1 . 
5 T. Balderston (1993) , The Origins and Course of the German Economic Crisis. 
November 1923 to May 1932, Berlin, pp . 382 (quote) , 4 0 1 , 4 0 5 - 4 0 7 , 412f. 
6 H . - J . Voth (1994b) , 'Much A d o About Nothing? A Note on Investment and Wage 
Pressure in Weimar Germany , 1 9 2 5 - 2 9 ' , Historical Social Research 19/3 , pp . 
124 -139 . Cf. an earlier article of Voth stressing, among others , the same points: i dem 
(1993a) , 'Wages , Investment , and the Fate of the Weimar Republ ic : A Long- te rm 
Perspec t ive ' , German History 1 1 , p p . 2 6 5 - 2 9 2 . Interesting enough, Voth started a 
still ongoing econometr ic debate with Albrecht Ritschl in late 1993 precisely in order 
to find the relevant causes for the Weimar Repub l i c ' s low investment record, a fact he 
did not quest ion in those papers ; cf. idem (1993b), ' Invest i t ionen in den »Goldenen 
Jahren« der Weimarer Republ ik ' , Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaf-
ten 113, pp . 6 2 9 - 6 3 3 ; A. Ritsehl (1994a) , 'Goldene Jahre? Zu d e n Invest i t ionen in 
der Weimarer Repub l ik ' , ibid. (114) , pp . 9 9 - 1 1 1 ; H.-J . Voth (1994a) , 'Zinsen, Inve-
stit ionen und das E n d e der Großen Depress ion ' , ibid. (114) , p p . 2 6 7 - 2 8 1 . 
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(A3) By using all tests, i t can be shown that the difference between the aver-
age per capita capital stock growth rates of the two periods is not sig-
nificant. Hence, the view that Weimar 's investment record was poor, a 
point on which nearly everybody in the debate so far agreed 7 , is rejected 
(pp. 133f., 139). 
( B l ) So far, calculations of the cumulative real wage position have been fla-
wed by using an inadequate price index (pp. 135f.). 
(B2) When using the appropriate price index, C R P figures no longer support 
Borchardt 's thesis of an increase in worker ' s share of the output (pp. 
138f.). 
(C) If (A) and (B) hold, then Borchardt and the other participants in the 
debate have merely chased a phantom: »Unless the findings in this paper 
can be substantially revised by future research, the debate over the weak-
ness of the Weimar economy should be over« (p. 139). 
The intention of this paper is to show that Voth's results do not stand up to 
closer scrutiny, and that even if they did, they would not be sufficient to 
support his conclusion as stated above. Concerning the measurement of invest-
ment, the concept Voth claims to introduce is neither new nor the most ade-
quate. His analysis is not only based on an arbitrarily chosen reference period, 
but also flawed by methodological mistakes. Furthermore, his calculations of 
the cumulative real wage position confirm Borchardt ' s wage pressure argument 
rather than contradict it. 
( A l ) Voth 's terminology is not unequivocal. He nearly always terms the 
measure he claims to introduce into the debate »capital increase per capita« or 
»investment per capita« (pp. 131, 133f., 138). Yet, this measure was used by 
Borchardt for the years 1905-13 and 1925-29 in precisely the paper that started 
the 'Borchardt Debate ' , and by other scholars, too . 8 Their motivation for this 
adjustment was of course to account for territorial changes in the aftermath of 
the Treaty of Versailles. In fact, Voth does not calculate capital increase per 
capita, but the (real) »rate of expansion of capital stock per capita« (p. 131). 
And this is not, as his formula (2) (p. 133) implies, K / N 9 , but 
(K/N) / (K/N) . 1 0 Hence, the method Voth claims to import from development 
economics into the debate has already been used by Borchardt and others. The 
only difference is that Voth's focus is on growth rates instead of levels. 
7 A notable exception being Holtfrerich, who originally agreed to this point (Holtfre-
rich (1984), pp. 123, 135), but recently challenged this view: Holtfrerich (1990) , pp. 
70f. 
8 Borchardt (1979), p. 127; English translation in: idem (1991) , p. 254: »The net 
investments per capita at constant prices...« (emphasis added). Other examples: A. 
Sommariva/G. Tullio (1987) , German Macroeconomic History. A Study of the Effects 
of Economic Policy on Inflation, Currency Depreciation and Growth, Basingstoke/ 
London, p. 19; Borchardt (1990), p. 128. 
9 Voth uses P for population instead of N. 
1 0 Using this measure - real capital stock growth rate per capita - it is possible to 
reproduce all of Voth's results, i.e. his tables 2 and 3, and figure 2 as well . 
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(A2) How is it that both Borchardt and Voth use the same measurement 
concept but draw different conclusions? Whereas Borchardt compared the late 
1920s with the years immediately preceding World War I (1910-13) 1 1 , Voth 
chooses a longer perspective (1900-13) . In search of an adequate reference 
period, two problems arise: should one compare periods with similar real pro-
duct growth or similar capital formation growth? After solving this problem, 
were the years 1925-29 on the upper bound of the thus defined business cycle, 
or did they form a full cycle themselves with a trough in 1926? Needless to say, 
there are no reliable figures before 1925, and the crisis from 1930 onwards was 
too severe to be compared to earlier ones in the prewar period. Whatever the 
answer to the first question might be, i t seems that the reference period chosen 
by Borchardt is one of substantial growth slightly above long term prewar 
average. Voth 's period covers roughly two full business cycles with their 
troughs in 1901 and 1908, the former one being the deepest prewar crisis since 
the end of the so-called Great Depression (1873-1895) . Since, as one might 
argue that Borchardt used figures above the average and Voth below the aver-
age, Table 1 also includes the figures for 1876 (see footnote 14) and 1905 to 
test whether the results are robust (Table l ) . 1 2 
Table 1 compares population growth before and after World War I with two 
different measures of capital growth (net investment). As can be seen from 
column (i), population growth remained fairly constant before World War I but 
experienced a marked slowdown thereafter. Columns (ii) and (iv) are the un-
adjusted growth rates of capital stock in Gewerbe, a broader concept than 
industry (see notes to Table 1), and in the entire economy, respectively. It is 
clearly visible that growth rates of capital stock in Gewerbe was on average 
1 1 Borchardt (1979), p. 127; idem (1991), p. 254. 
12 Voth's and my recalculation's percentages differ only from .01 to .03 percentage 
points, in one case (c - Table 1, col. (iv), 1900-13) his percentage is 3.13, mine 3.23. 
Except for the latter one these differences might be explained by different calculation 
methods. Average annual growth rates are calculated here by 
exp((ln(capital stock in endyear)-ln(capital stock in startyear))/(endyear-startyear)>-l. 
In the last decade, considerable doubts have been raised concerning Hoffmann's data, 
cf. for the 19th century: C.-L. Holtfrerich (1983), 'The Growth of Net Domestic 
Product in Germany 1850-1913', in R. Fremdling/P.K. O'Brien (eds), Productivity in 
the Economies of Europe, Stuttgart, pp. 124-132; R. Fremdling (1988), 'German 
National Accounts for the 19th and Early 20th Century. A Critical Assessment', 
Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 75, pp. 339-357. Cf. the 
latter for the inter-war years, too, and: A. Ritschl (1990), 'Zu hohe Löhne in der 
Weimarer Republik? Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Holtfrerichs Berechnungen zur 
Lohnposition der Arbeiterschaft 1925-1932', Geschichte und Gesellschaft 16, pp. 
375-402; idem (1992), 'Über die Höhe und Struktur der gesamtwirtschaftlichen In-
vestitionen in Deutschland 1935-38', Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschafts-
geschichte 79, pp. 156-176; idem (1994b), On the Origins and Course of the Great 
Depression in Germany: A Quantitative Assessment of Industrial Production and 
Aggregate Output Data, 1925-1938, unpublished manuscript, Universität Pompeu 
Fabra, Dept. of Economics, September 1994. 
3 0 
Table 1: Population and Real Capital Stock Growth, Germany 1876-1913, 1925-29 (average annual growth rates, 
in %) 
Notes: All figures calculated with price base 1913. Data for industry only not available. Gewerbe includes mining, 
industry, crafts, trade, banks, insurance, and transport except for rai lroads and postal services. Last four lines not 
growth rates, but relative differences in per cent. Cols, (iii), (v) calculated directly from the data, thus minor 
differences to (ii)-(i) and (iv)-(i), respectively. 
a - o see text below, c - f, j, k can be found in Voth's Table 2, cols. 2, 3, l ines 1, 2, 4 (p. 131, minor differences). 
Source: Calculated from Walther Hoffmann et. al. (1965), Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft seit der Mitte 
des 19. Jahrhunderts, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York, pp. 173f, 215 , 254. 
faster than in the aggregate. Apart from this effect, which results from the still 
ongoing process of industrialization in late 19th century Germany, both series 
exhibit fairly similar characteristics. In particular, they both show a sharp slow-
down in the years 1925-29. To adjust for the effect of population growth, the 
obvious procedure is to subtract population growth from capital growth. This is 
done in column (iii) for Gewerbe and in column (v) for the entire economy. 
Voth makes a lot of this adjustment but apparently overlooks that, to my know-
ledge, all contributions to the Borchardt Debate have discussed only adjusted 
figures of this sort. Of course, as population growth slowed down in the 1920s, 
the adjusted per-capita series (iii) and (v) exhibit a considerably lower slow-
down in capital accumulation than the unadjusted series do. Voth focuses his 
analysis on k, the relative difference between the adjusted growth rates per 
capita in the periods 1900-13 (d) and 1925-29 (f). Is a 10% decrease neglec-
table, as Voth claims, or not? 
(A3) In his paper, Voth proceeds by calculating the absolute differences of 
the unadjusted and adjusted average annual growth rates of overall net invest-
m e n t c - e - . 90 1 3 and d - f = .19, respectively. Using a parametric (t-) and a 
non-parametric (Mann-Whitney U-) test, he then tests whether the differences 
of the means are statistically significant He claims to s h o w 1 4 that the difference 
of the unadjusted means, .90, is highly significant, but that both methods fail to 
identify a statistically significant difference between the adjusted means, .19. 
This, he infers, indicates that there probably is none. Thus, »Weimar , s invest-
ment record was not significantly different from the Empire 's« (p. 134). 
However, if the test statistics lead h im not to reject the null hypothesis ( H 0 
here: the two samples ' means, d and f, belong to the same population, the 
observed difference being sampling error), this does not necessarily imply that 
the null hypothesis is ' t rue ' , that there is indeed no meaningful difference 
Probably due to a different calculation method, his f igures slightly devia te f rom mine 
(c - e - .97 in my Table 1), see footnote 12. 
As reference period, Voth so far considers the years 1 9 0 0 - 1 3 , and thus the means he 
calculates , c and d, refer to this per iod. So it is unclear w h y in the significance tests 
he performs, he suddenly shifts the beginning of his prewar t ime series to 24 years 
earlier, n o w reaching f rom 1876-1913 instead of 1900-13 (p . 133). Voth nei ther 
explains this shift nor justifies the year 1876, thus far not considered as a benchmark 
in G e r m a n economic history. H o w can he analyze the significance of the m e a n s ' 
differences of 1900 -13 (unadjusted: c - 3 . 2 3 % , adjusted: d - 1 . 8 2 % ) by us ing the pe -
riod 1 8 7 6 - 1 9 1 3 , which has different means (unadjusted: a « 3 . 0 0 % , adjusted: 
b=1 .78%)? This becomes even more incomprehensible i f one recalculates the t-test 
for the period Voth himself originally has chosen, 1900 -13 : both the significance 
levels of the t-test and even the significance level of L e v e n e ' s test for equali ty of 
var iances improve in his sense (mean difference = .9417, standard deviat ions = .402 
(1900-13 ) and .870 (1925 -29 ) , L e v e n e ' s test for equali ty of variances: p - . O l l ; t-va-
lue for equal var iances * 3.29, two-tailed significance - .004). Choos ing the refe-
rence period 1909-13 also gives a statistically significant difference of the unadjusted 
means . So , w h y does he extend the reference period, and w h y to 1876? 
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between d and f. An inference like this risks the so-called ' type II error ' : not 
rejecting a false null hypothesis . 1 5 The fact alone that Voth 's second period 
under consideration, 1925-29, has only five observations, should have sugge-
sted caution. Not finding significant t-statistics is not too surprising with such a 
small sample. Yet, Voth draws the above quoted conclusion that the investment 
pattern hardly differed. It should be clear now that this conclusion, especially in 
Voth's definitive formulation (pp. 138f.), is unwarranted. 
Furthermore, if one uses tests of significance developed for sampling theory 
to make inferences about t ime ser ies 1 6 , the periods chosen should be at least 
similar to ' samples ' , i.e. chosen by some random-like procedure from a 'popu-
lation' , which is here the set of possible reference periods for the prewar years. 
Looking again at Table 1, it becomes clear that the reference period Voth has 
chosen, 1900-13 , is very favorable to his thesis. Whether the difference of 10% 
he looks at (k) is substantial or not, is indeed not clear. Comparisons with h, m, 
and o show that Voth's results strongly depend on the reference period. Going 
back to 1876 narrows the gap of the average annual growth rates per capita 
between the prewar period and 1925-29 to 8% (h). But i t widens considerably 
when looking at the period 1905-13 (m), which still has a trough in 1908, and 
it becomes dramatic when looking at the period Borchardt has favored, 1910-13 
(o). When comparing the relative differences of adjusted Gewerbe capital stock 
growth (column (iii)), the period Voth has chosen is clearly the min imum 
among the ' samples ' considered here: Comparing 1925-29 with 1900-13 
shows a relatively small decrease of 12% (i), but compared to every other 
reference period (g, 1, n) , the adjusted growth of Gewerbe capital stock slowed 
down considerably in 1925-29. This indicates that the mean of Voth 's ' s ample ' 
period 1900-13 is considerably smaller than the mean of the 'populat ion ' , the 
set of prewar reference periods. In a way, this is a 'sampling error ' , but one 
which should be blamed on lack of prudence rather than chance. Hence, i t 
should be clear by now that even if one accepts per capita investment as an 
adequate measurement concept for investment behavior, Hoffmann's figures do 
not support Voth's thesis. 
Yet, is the concept he uses adequate? In order to analyze investment behavior, 
most economic historians usually relate net investment, K, to net real product, 
Y (that is, the ratio of net investment to net national or net domestic product ) . 1 7 
Again, it should be emphasized that in the German case, the need for this is all 
1 5 Cf. W . H . Greene (1990) , Econometric Analysis, p . 123. 
1 6 Critical of this f rom a pur i s t ' s point of view: D .N. McCloskey/S .T . Zil iak (1993) , The 
Standard Error of Regressions, unpubl ished manuscript , Universi ty of Iowa, Dep t . of 
Economics , December 1993, p p . 6f. 
1 7 E . g . Borchardt (1979) , p . 127; Holtfrerich (1990) , p . 7 1 ; D . Petz ina (1990) , 'Was 
There a Cris is Before the Crisis? T h e State of the G e r m a n E c o n o m y in the 1920s ' , in 
J. v. Kruedener (ed.) , Economic Crisis and Political Collapse. The Weimar Republic 
1924-1933, N e w York/Oxford/Munich, p p . 1-19, here p . 12. 
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the more obvious because of territorial changes after World War I. Interestingly 
enough, this is not only recognized by Voth (pp. 126, 128, 138f. 1 8 ), but used in 
his own earlier work . 1 9 Nevertheless, he must have overlooked that by using 
real product as denominator, changes in the population N are still taken into 
account a slower growing labor force requires less real net investment to 
sustain a constant capital per capita level (K / N) , and it produces a lower real 
product, too. Furthermore, choosing Y instead of N as denominator is more 
adequate whenever the demographic environment is in motion: after a sudden 
demographic change as in the case discussed here, during an adjustment period 
of a full generation's life, society becomes older, until a new, higher equi-
librium average age is reached. 2 0 Adjusting for population ( K / N) or popu-
lation growth ( ( K / N ) / (K /N) ) implies that if society is ageing, babies - whose 
ratio of the population decreases - 'need ' the same capital stock as adults, 
whereas using real product ( K / Y) fully takes this kind of cohort effect into 
account. As the Weimar Republic 's society was ageing, i t should be noted that 
a priori K / Y is favorable to Voth 's argumentation. 
As the phenomenon to be explained here is Weimar 's supposed investment 
weakness, it is reasonable to take a look not only at capital formation of the 
entire economy ( K ) , but also at that of Gewerbe ( KQ) as a proxy for industry 
for which data are not available. As a second refinement, inventory investment 
should be excluded to focus on net investment in fixed assets ( K*). What Y is 
adequate? Standard economics textbooks recommend net national product 
(NNP) at market pr ices 2 1 , but as the focus here is on the competitiveness of the 
German economy and not of the Germans, net domestic product at market 
prices (NDP) should be preferred, if the data are available. 
Wha t sources should be used? As Hoffmann's data are still standard and 
Voth relies on them, K / Y and KQ / YG will be calculated from Hoffmann 
(Table 2, cols, (i), (v)). Yet, more adequate figures have been constructed or 
rediscovered in the last decade. Holtfrerich has constructed N D P growth factors 
for 1851-1913 out of Hoffmann's data which are more adequate than Hoff-
mann ' s own aggregated figures for N D P and show slightly larger growth rates 
on the average ( i i ) . 2 2 For the years after 1923, Ritschl has emphasized that the 
contemporary output data are more plausible than those of Hoffmann who 
probably sacrificed precision in the inter-war years to have a consistent t ime 
series stretching back to 1850. 2 3 Hence, for 1925-29, the data of the official 
1 8 Apparent ly , Voth cont inously confounds gross domest ic product with net nat ional 
product here . Hoffmann did not publish any G D P or G N P figures. 
1 9 Voth (1993a) , p . 274 . 
2 0 Th i s a rgument has been formalized in growth theory, e.g. G.T . McCandless j rTN. 
Wallace (1991) , Introduction to Dynamic Macroeconomic Theory. An Overlapping 
Generations Approach, Cambr idge (Mass.) /London, p p . 2 4 5 - 2 4 8 . 
2 1 E .g . A. Stobbe (1980) , Volkswirtschaftslehre I. Vollcswirtschaftliches Rechnungswe-
seny 5th ed., Berl in/Heidelberg/New York, p. 374. 
^ H o l t f r e r i c h (1983) , p . 130; cf. F remdl ing (1988) . 
2 3 Ritschl (1994b) , p . 4 . 
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Statistisches Jahrbuch and the Konjunkturstatistisches Handbuch, a publica-
tion of the semi-official and well respected Institut für Konjunkturforschung 
(IfK) are used in columns (iii) and (iv). They also contain K*, which is not 
available for the prewar period. In a recent paper, Ritschl (1994b) proposes a 
correction procedure for Hoffmann's data of output in metal-processing from 
which new figures for Hoffmann's industrial production and N D P can be cal-
culated. This correction is implemented in column (v) for Gewerbe output . 2 4 It 
should be emphasized that it is impossible to exclude inventory investment 
from Hoffmann's data for both K and K G . 2 5 TO check the results below, i t might 
have been sensible to look at gross investment too, especially because estimates 
of depreciation are notoriously inaccurate . 2 6 But deriving meaningful results 
would require figures of either the gross national or gross domestic product in 
the denominator, which are not available. 2 7 
What time periods should be considered? As the purpose here is to show that 
Weimar 's investment record was indeed low, it is sufficient to compare the 
period 1925-29, which definitely was not at the lower bound of the business 
cycle, with full business cycles. Hence, except for 1910-13 , the prewar re-
ference periods chosen in Table 2 form full business cycles with their period 
lengths determined as recommended by Holtfrerich (Table 2 ) . 2 8 
Apart from being conceptually more adequate, adjusting net investment by 
real product rather than population yields results which are robust to the choice 
of reference period. From 1925-29, the average net investment ratio was about 
1 1 % , from 1900 to 1913 about 15% (col. ( i ) ) . 2 9 The relative difference between 
the net investment ratio of the prewar period and 1925-29 is about - 2 5 % to 
- 3 0 % both in Gewerbe and the aggregate economy, whatever reference period 
is considered. One has to go back into the 1880s, in the middle of the Great 
Depression, to find periods with a similar low average of 1 1 % . 
Furthermore, Weimar 's net investment record has two characteristics that 
underline the irregularities of this period: even in the Gründerkrise of the mid 
1870s there were no such low net investment ratios for the aggregate economy 
as in the years 1926 and 1929. Taking into account that output and probably 
investment levels, too, were low in World War I, during the hyperinflation, and 
2 4 Not revising Hoffmann ' s industrial output data by the procedure Ri tschl has proposed 
leads to slightly lower figures in col . (v): average 1927-29 : 9 . 5 3 % , average 1925-29 : 
8 .75%. T h e relative differences to the prewar periods increase to 3 2 - 3 4 % . 
2 5 Cf. Hoffmann (1965) , p p . 2 1 5 , 2 3 9 - 2 4 1 , 244f. 
2 6 G . Gehr ig (1961) , 'E ine Zeitreihe fur den Sachkapitalbestand (1925 bis 1938 und 
1950 bis 1957) ' , IFO-Studien 7 , p p . 7 - 6 0 . 
2 7 To construct G N P data from Hoffmann ' s N N P data, one might be tempted to add 
Gehr ig ' s gross investment data to the N N P and subtract Hof fmann ' s net investment 
data. But as Hoffmann ' s data include inventory investment and Gehr ig ' s not , these 
t ime series are not compat ible . 
2 8 Holtfrerich (1983) , p . 130. 
2 9 Slightly deviat ing figures in: Borchardt (1979) , p . 127. 
3 5 

Notes for Table 2: Standard deviat ion data are not percentages . Las t four l ines not 
growth rates , but relat ive differences in per cent. 
° Long- run compar isons with his data not r ecommended by Holtfrerich (1983) , p . 
127. 
* Exc lud ing inventory investment . 
IfK - Institut für Konjunkturforschung, S ta tRA - Statistisches Reichsamt. 
Sources and calculat ion methods: 
(i) net investment (current prices) / net national product at market pr ices (current 
pr ices) ; Hoffmann (1965) , p p . 259f., 825f. Us ing Hof fmann ' s deflated net invest-
ment and N N P data (prices 1913) instead does not change the picture . T h e relat ive 
differences even tend more to - 3 0 % than to - 2 5 % , and the relat ive differences of 
the standard deviat ions increase. 
(ii) net investment (1913 prices) / real net domest ic product at factor cost; Hoffmann 
(1965) , p p . 257f., 455 ; Holtfrerich (1983) , p . 130. 
(iii) net investment (current prices) / net national product at factor cost (current pr ices) ; 
Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich 1938, p. 5 6 5 ; Konjunkturstatisti-
sches Handbuch 1933, p. 80; i dem 1936, p. 9 5 ; Statistisches Handbuch von 
Deutschland 1928-1944 (1949) , München , p p . 600 , 604 . Us ing the pr ice index for 
producer goods (Konjunkturstatistisches Handbuch 1936, p. 104) as deflator for 
net investment and Hoffmann ' s N N P deflator (Hoffmann (1965) , p . 6 0 1 , col . 14) 
for N N P produces slightly higher averages for 1925-29 : (iii) and (iv) increase to 
11 .45% and 9 .29%, respectively. 
(iv) as (iii), excluding net inventory investment (current prices) . 
(v) Gewerbe net investment (prices 1913) / Gewerbe output (prices 1913); Hof fmann 
(1965) , pp . 257f., 424f., 454f. Hof fmann ' s figures for output of industry and crafts 
1925-29 revised by Ritschl (1994b) , p . 15. 
in the post-stabilization crisis of 1924, the upswing of 1927/28 seems not to 
have been sufficient to have allowed for a full catch-up. Still more interesting is 
the standard deviation of 1925-29 which doubles the 1900-13 values and is 
still considerably larger than any other value in the period considered. 3 0 As the 
comparison between columns (iii) and (iv) shows, this erratic behaviour was 
partially driven by the destabilizing effect of inventory inves tment It should be 
emphasized that, when investigating ' investment weakness ' , inventory invest-
ment should be excluded and thus column (iv) is most adequate for the que-
stions discussed here. Unfortunately, no comparable figures for the prewar 
period are available. Another interesting topic for future research is the appa-
rent s lowdown of Gewerbe investment relative to aggregate investment after 
the turn of the century. 
Concentrating on the peak from 1927-29 only or changing from Hoffmann's 
to other sources (ii), (iii), does not change the overall impression: if Hoff-
mann ' s or Holtfrerich's data for the prewar years are reliable, then the net 
investment ratio in Weimar 's 'Golden Twenties ' had a much larger amplitude 
than any full business cycle after 1871 and, contrary to Voth 's thesis, clearly 
This also holds for every 5-year-per iod f rom 1 8 7 0 - 7 4 to 1 9 0 9 - 1 3 : T h e largest 
5-year-per iod standard deviat ion is 2.55 (1874-78) . 
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was about 2 5 % to 30% lower than in any prewar period after the Great Depres-
sion. 
( B l ) Voth criticizes Ritschl for having calculated the cumulative real wage 
position (CRP) using a misleading denominator. What is the CRP? In the 
simple form used in the Borchardt Debate so far, 
CRP = ( W / P ) / ( Y / L ) , 
with W = nominal wage, P = price level, Y = real product, and L = labor input. 
Hence, W / P is the real wage, and Y / L labor productivity. 3 1 Borchardt in-
troduced this measure in order to illustrate his thesis that wage pressure induced 
a profit squeeze and thus led to low investment. The advantage of the C R P as 
compared to looking at merely real wages, is that it relates the latter to labor 
productivity. If both real wages and labor productivity increase on the same 
level, labor 's share of the real product remains constant, the real wage increase 
thus is distributionally neutral. Hence, if CRP in 1913 is 100, higher figures for 
the 1920s indicate that labor 's 'share of the cake ' has increased, and the entr-
epreneur 's decreased, respectively. 
Voth maintains that the index of industrial prices is relevant to test the 
question whether entrepreneurs faced wage pressure, not the cost-of-living in-
dex as used by Holtfrerich and Ritschl (p. 136). This argument seems plausible 
concerning the CRP of industry, but not concerning the C R P for the entire 
economy. As Voth himself shows in his figure 3 (p. 137), the t ime pattern of 
the index of industrial prices was more volatile than that of the cost-of-living 
index. This is not a surprise, as demand for investment goods and consumer 
durables (which in fact drove the index up 3 2 ) is more elastic than demand for 
everyday consumer goods. As industrial prices started to fall already in 1929, 
Voth's CRP for the entire economy indicates a higher value in 1927 than in 
1929, which is not plausible and can not be found in any other C R P calculation. 
Hoffmann constructed two N N P deflators which are used in columns (ix) and 
(x) below. Yet, one should keep in mind that all CRP calculations for the entire 
economy, (iv) to (x), may be biased, since we only have data on the nominal 
hourly wages in industry, not of the economy as a whole . 3 3 
(B2) Correct or not, does Voth's denominator produce new evidence on 
labor 's share of the domestic product (Table 3)? At a first glance, the multi tude 
3 1 S.N. Broadberry /A.O. Ritschl (1994) , 'The I ron Twenties: Rea l Wages , Product ivi ty 
and the Lack of Prosperi ty in Bri tain and Germany Before the Great Depress ion ' , in 
C. Buchhe im/M. Hutter /H. James (eds), Zerrissene Zwischenkriegszeit. Wirtschafts-
historische Beiträge. Knut Borchardt zum 65. Geburtstag, Baden-Baden, p p . 1 5 - 4 3 , 
here pp . 17f. 
3 2 The share of consumer (semi-) durables (furniture, textiles, shoes , etc.) of the index 
of industrial pr ices was 5 7 % ; see Vierteljahreshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen 
Reichs 1932, 41/1, p p . 139, 142. Prices in this sector had risen rapidly be tween 1913 
and 1925, see Konjunkturstatistisches Handbuch 1936, p p . 106f. 
3 3 Cf. Ritschl (1990), p p . 380f. 
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Table 3: Cumulative Real Wage Position in Industry and the Aggregate Economy, Germany 1913 and 1925-29 
Industry Entire Economy 
Ritschl Holtfr. Voth Holtfr. Ritschl 1 Ritschl2 RitschB Voth (Hofif.l) (Hoff.2) 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (V) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (X) 
1913 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1925 115.7 90.3 104.6 97.5 113.4 111.8 108.5 102.6 112.0 113.2 
1926 112.7 92.2 106.3 104.0 111.4 110.0 111.9 105.2 111.5 113.7 
1927 109.4 91.9 110.2 98.1 114.9 114.2 108.8 115.4 111.6 114.9 
1928 119.5 105.8 114.2 103.4 117.2 117.0 115.2 112.1 113.7 117.9 
1929 118.8 102.2 116.1 98.9 115.5 115.2 116.5 113.0 115.3 117.3 
1925-29 +2.7% +13.2% +11.0% +1.4% +1.9% +3.0% +7.4% +10 .1% +2.9% 3.6% 
Sources: (i), (v) Broadberry/Ritschl (1994), p. 19 (see footnote 36); (ii) calculated from Holtfrerich (1990), p. 73, 
Table 4.1, cols. 2, 3; (iii), (viii) Voth (1994b), pp. 138f.; (vi), (vii) Ritschl (1990), p. 391, Table 5, cols. III. IV; 
(ix), (x) calculated as follows: nominal gross hourly wages in industry (W) from Statistisches Bundesamt (ed.) 
(1972), Bevölkerung und Wirtschaft 1872-1972, Stuttgart/Mainz, p. 254; net national product deflators (P), from 
Hoffmann (1965), p. 601, cols. 14 (ix), 15 (x); output per hour worked (Y/L) from Ritschl (1990), p. 390, Table 
4, col. II. 
of different C R P figures might be confusing. Yet, three different patterns can be 
established: 
- Holtfrerich's CRP for the entire economy (iv) certainly contradicts Bor-
chardt ' s thesis of wage pressure: his CRP does not show a substantial gap 
between real wages and labor productivity either within the late 1920s, or 
compared to 1913. For a detailed criticism of Holtfrerich's results, see 
Ritschl (1990). 
- RitschTs C R P figures - (i) and (v)-(vii) , Ritschl 1 to 3 using alternative 
output concepts - and the CRPs constructed with Hoffmann's N N P defla-
tors along with Ritschl 's productivity data, (ix) and (x), indicate that labor ' s 
position already had substantially improved in 1925 as compared to 1913, 
and continued to do so in the late 1920s. 3 4 
- Voth 's figures, (iii) and (viii), as well as the CRP for industry constructed 
from Holtfrerich (1990), (ii), indicate that at the beginning of Weimar 's 
stabilization period, 1924/25, C R P was at about its 1913 level or lower. The 
enormous wage increases of 1927 and 1928 made the C R P jump at least 
seven percentage points to a level slightly above 100 (Holtfrerich) or more 
than 110 (Voth). 
Concerning Borchardt 's wage pressure argument, only Holtfrerich's CRP for 
the entire economy (iv) contradicts this. All the other CRPs, including Voth 's , 
indicate that labor 's share of the real product either improved at some time 
between 1913 and 1925, or 1927/28. They also, including Voth 's again, show a 
substantial increase in 1927/28, these being the years of the biggest increases of 
nominal wages both in the private and the public sector of the Weimar Repub-
l i c . 3 5 Thus , regardless of whether his calculation method is appropriate or not, it 
is hard to see how Voth 's data should contradict Ritschl 's and thus the Bor-
chardt Hypothesis. Obviously, Voth 's figures are much closer to Ritschl 's than 
to Holtfrerich's, whose results he claims to confirm (p. 138). An industry 
lobbyist of the late 1920s having the choice between the CRP calculations of 
Table 3, would definitely prefer Voth's which show a dramatic increase of 
labor 's share in 1927/28 as compared to both 1913 and 1925. The same holds 
for Borchardt or Ritschl: none of Ritschl 's CRPs underlines the wage pressure 
hypothesis as clearly as Voth's d o . 3 6 Hence, using the industrial price index 
instead of the cost-of-living index does not contradict Borchardt and Ritschl, 
but even supports their arguments. 
3 4 In Table 3 , cols , (i) and (vi) are no t taken from Ritschl (1990), to which Voth refers, 
bu t f rom Broadberry/Ritschl (1994) . Ritschl seems to have corrected some of his 
figures slightly. Us ing Ri t sch l ' s 1990 figures would not change the essence of the 
remarks be low. 
3 5 E . g . Balders ton (1993) , p . 16, Table 2.4. , col. (2). 
3 6 Voth ' s a rgument that one should not take the differences of his figures to 100 too 
serious due to errors in the under lying macroeconomic statistics (p . 136) seems to be 
very arbitrary, especially i f one looks at h is c lose examinat ion of the . 90% and . 1 9 % 
differences in (A3) . 
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The analysis of VotiYs argumentation has shown that his efforts to question the 
notion of Weimar 's investment weakness fail. The method he claims to intro-
duce into the debate is neither new nor the most adequate, the reference period 
he uses to compare the prewar period with Weimar is arbitrary, and the in-
ferences drawn from the significance tests he uses are unwarranted. Moreover, 
relating net investment to net real product is a more appropriate measure of an 
economy's propensity to invest and hence has often been used by the partici-
pants in the debate. Using a variety of statistical sources, a more detailed 
analysis of both Voth 's approach and that of conventional economic analysis 
shows clearly that net investment adjusted by population or real product was 
considerably lower and much more volatile in the Weimar Republic than in the 
Empire. 
Furthermore, although Voth uses an inappropriate price index when recal-
culating CRP for the entire economy, his results do not contradict those of 
Borchardt and Ritschl, but rather underline them. The price index he has chosen 
for the calculation of industry 's C R P seems to be plausible, but again it is 
impossible to see how his figures should contradict Ritschl 's . So Borchardt ' s 
wage pressure argument is not rejected, but supported by Voth 's results. 
(C) For a moment, let us be counterfactual and imagine that Voth had suc-
ceeded in revising our assessment of net investment and the cumulative real 
wage position, that both arguments (A) and (B) were sustainable. What con-
clusion could be drawn from this? One has to differentiate between the symp-
toms of a crisis and its causes. For the participants in the Borchardt Debate, his 
wage pressure hypothesis is one possible cause among many. What is even 
more important, is that weak investment is only one symptom of crisis among 
many. Even if Voth had succeeded in showing that these two features did not 
differ from the prewar period, how can he deny other symptoms of crisis, e.g. 
high capital costs, low profits, rising foreign debt, permanent current account 
deficits, »ossification of the economic-political structures« 3 7 , and the precarious 
situation of the public budgets? And, above all: can a serious economic hi-
storian ignore more than two million unemployed in mid -1926 and more than 
three million in early 1929? I do sympathize with Voth's efforts to have a 
different look at the causes of the irregularities of the Weimar economy, but for 
the reasons developed above I definitely cannot accept his conclusion that his 
findings end the ongoing debate. Knut Borchardt and his supporters might or 
might not be right in their more conservative point of view concerning the 
causes of Weimar 's economic weakness, but their efforts to investigate a period 
of obvious and serious socio-economic problems should not be regarded as a 
mock assault on a non-existing problem, as perhaps 19 million registered un-
employed in the EU would agree. 
3 7 Borchardt (1990) , p . 132. Cf. on labor market r ig id i t i e s : B . E ichengreen (1994) , 
'Wages and the Gold Standard. Perspect ives on the Borchardt D e b a t e ' , in C. Buch-
he im/M. Hut ter /H. James (eds), Zerrissene Zwischenkriegszeit. Wirtschaftshistori-
sche Beiträge. Knut Borchardt zum 65. Geburtstag, Baden-Baden , p p . 1 7 7 - 2 0 3 . 
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